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SIXTH CIRCUIT REVIEW 
Rationing Treatment in Prisons Implies Some Will 
Be Without: Prisons Should Not Be Able to Escape 




The Sixth Circuit in Atkins v. Parker wrestled with the question of whether 
or not to agree with a lower court’s judgement holding that Tennessee’s scheme 
for rationing hepatitis C drugs to prisoners was constitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment. No. 19-6243 (6th Cir. Aug. 24, 2020).1 
In 2019, roughly twenty-three percent of Tennessee’s 21,000 inmate 
population had hepatitis C. Id. at 3.2 This contagious virus worsens over time 
and can lead to serious liver issues, and even death.3 Between seventy-five and 
eighty-five percent of infected people do not spontaneously recover within the 
first six months, proceeding to the “chronic” stage. Atkins, No. 19-6243, at 2.4 
Here, the virus progressively scars the liver. Id.5 Between twenty and forty 
percent of people at this stage develop cirrhosis and four percent develop liver 
cancer. Id.6 There is no vaccine, so doctors were stuck treating the virus with 
drugs called interferons, but this form of treatment had little success. Id.7 But 
good news arrived in 2011 with the newly FDA approved antivirals which, for 
most patients, stopped hepatitis C in its tracks and vanished the virus completely 
within a few months.8 Here comes the bad news . . . the antiviral treatment is 
not free, in fact, it’s quite costly at around $17,000 per prisoner.9 
To combat the high price of treatment, the Tennessee Department of 
Corrections (the Department) implemented a new policy to ration the treatment. 
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As of 2019, every inmate is tested and evaluated to determine the extent of their 
living scarring, and accordingly, their course of treatment. Atkins, No. 19-6243, 
at 3.10 Using these determinations, an advisory committee decides who is to be 
treated with the antivirals. The committee favors the sickest inmates as they are 
“at higher risk for complications of disease progression and may require more 
urgent consideration for treatment,” but does stress that the determinations are 
patient-specific and reassessed periodically. Id. at 4 (internal quotations 
omitted).11 
The question here is whether the conduct of the Department is a violation 
of the Eight Amendment. The Eighth Amendment states “Excessive bail shall 
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.”12 Specifically, here, the Appellants claim that by not providing the 
antivirals to all infected inmates, the Department violated the “cruel and unusual 
punishment” clause of the Eighth Amendment. 
At trial, the plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Zhiqiang Yao, stated that “the ‘best 
practice’ [and standard of care] is to treat chronic hepatitis C with direct-acting 
antivirals ‘as early as possible’ or ‘in a timely manner,’ regardless of the extent 
of scarring on a patient’s liver.” Atkins, No. 19-6243, at 5.13 He conceded that 
the guidance was “under that standard of care” as it gave priority to the antivirals 
on a patient-specific basis and also added that this “approach was 
‘understandable’ given the Department’s limited resources.” Id.14 
Dr. Kenneth Williams, the medical director for the Department, stated they 
had used all money budgeted to them for hepatitis C antivirals and claimed to 
consistently seek budget increases for treatments. Id. at 6.15 They used every 
penny and estimated that based on the prior year’s budget, they’d be able to treat 
all inmates with advanced liver scarring. Id.16 
The district court found that the Department’s guidance of prioritizing the 
sickest patients for treatment met their constitutional obligations. Id.17 The 
plaintiffs appealed on the belief that “Williams’s failure to provide direct-acting 
antivirals to every infected inmate amounted to deliberate indifference in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 7.18 This claim requires an objective 
and a subjective component both be met. Atkins, No. 19-6243, at 7.19 There must 
be objective proof that the plaintiffs had a “sufficiently serious medical need.” 
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See Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 737 (6th Cir. 2018).20 On top of that, there 
must be subjective proof that Williams understood the substantial risk that 
hepatitis C posed to all infected inmates, yet consciously disregarded this risk. 
See id. at 738.21 
All three circuit judges presiding over this case decided that the objective 
component was met: the plaintiffs clearly had a “sufficiently serious medical 
need.” Atkins, No. 19-6243, at 7.22 Furthermore, all three judges decided that 
part of the subjective component was also met: Williams clearly understood the 
risk that hepatitis C posed to the inmates. Id.23 The 2-1 split decision rested on 
the question of whether or not Williams alone “‘so recklessly ignored the risk’ 
of hepatitis C, in designing and implementing the 2019 guidance, that he was 
deliberately indifferent to the risk.” See Rhinehart, 894 F.3d at 738.24 
Circuit Judges Kethledge and Murphy, the majority, held Dr. Williams did 
not recklessly ignore the risk in his 2019 guidance. Atkins, No. 19-6243, at 8.25 
His guidance required evaluation, monitoring, and continuous care efforts for 
every infected inmate; he obtained diagnostic equipment to measure liver 
scarring; he established a committee to make and revise individualized decisions 
of proper treatment; he revised prioritization criteria to give the sickest inmates 
better access to treatment; and he claimed to have sought budget increases for 
treatment. Id. at 7–8.26 The majority felt that this clearly showed the opposite of 
indifference to the risk hepatitis C posed to infected inmates. Id. at 8.27 He could 
not spend money that his budget did not have at its disposal. To this point, the 
plaintiffs suggest that he violated the Constitution by not petitioning Congress 
for more money. Id.28 The majority here disagrees and points to the fact that 
Williams consistently sought and received yearly budget increases. Id.29 The 
majority also finds no legitimate ground to obligate a state medical official to 
lobby the legislature for additional funds, and by not doing so, violating the 
Eighth Amendment. Id.30 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision 
with a 2-1 majority.31 
The sole dissenter, Circuit Judge Gilman, believes Dr. William’s rationing 
scheme fails to consider the substantial risk of serious harm to infected inmates. 
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Atkins, No. 19-6243, at 15 (Gilman, J., dissenting).32 Judge Gilman points out 
that, although Dr. Yao used a system of prioritization and rationing care for 
hepatitis C patients while working for the Veterans’ Administration (VA), Dr. 
Yao had since testified that “data began to show the benefits of early treatment 
and the long-term risks of delay” which caused the VA to stop this practice. Id. 
at 9–10.33 This data comes from HCV Guidance: Recommendations for Testing, 
Managing, and Treating Hepatitis C.34 This document, which most medical 
providers follow, has since removed prioritization tables from its guidelines.35 
The dissent follows the HPV Guidance in saying chronic hepatitis C patients 
need to be treated as soon as possible, as delaying such treatment causes the 
“substantial risk of serious harm” consistently recognized from an Eighth 
Amendment standpoint. Atkins, No. 19-6243, at 10 (Gilman, J., dissenting).36 
Therefore, rationing schemes should be abandoned, because yes, not all chronic 
patients are severely sick, but by the time they start becoming clearly sick and 
able to be prioritized, the risk of liver-related death has already increased “two-
to-five fold as compared to treating the infection at an earlier stage.” Id. at 10–
11.37 Death is not the sole harm in delaying treatment: “depression, fatigue, sore 
muscles, joint pain, kidney injury, diabetes or glucose intolerance, certain types 
of rashes or autoimmune diseases, lymphoma and leukemia are all potential 
effects.” Id. at 11 (internal quotations omitted).38 The dissent argues these 
conditions should not be suffered by anyone if a treatment is available within 
the scope of the Eighth Amendment. Judge Gilman further contends Dr. 
Williams never actually requested enough funding to treat every chronic 
hepatitis C inmate even though he acknowledged the Department’s 
commissioner never turned him down when asking for additional antiviral 
money. Id. at 14.39 
Judge Gilman stated, “officials may not . . . refuse to treat a patient who has 
a serious medical need . . . merely to avoid paying a bill.” Id. at 15.40 Simply 
not having proper funding does not excuse an Eighth Amendment violation. 
Id.41 There are a number of cases that the dissent points to including the 
Supreme Court case of Watson v. City of Memphis, where the Court held you 
cannot excuse a constitutional violation based on cost. 373 U.S. 526, 537 
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(1963).42 In Watson, the city of Memphis was mandated by Brown v. Board of 
Education to desegregate a local playground, but the city stated they needed to 
postpone due to budgetary concerns. Id., citing Brown v. Board of Education, 
349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).43 The Court rejected the argument of the city saying, 
“‘it is obvious that vindication of conceded constitutional rights cannot be made 
dependent upon any theory that it is less expensive to deny than to afford them.” 
Id.44 Another Supreme Court case, Brown v. Plata, goes on to suggest that if 
resources will not allow the prisons to be in conformity with constitutional 
requirements, “the answer is to release or transfer prisoners rather than 
continuing to subject them to unconstitutional conditions.” Atkins, No. 19-6243, 
at 13, citing Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011).45 The Eighth Circuit 
proposed a similar answer in Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, which 
additionally holds that a lack of resources isn’t an excuse to allow for the 
continuation of Eighth Amendment violations. 505 F.2d 194, 201 (8th Cir. 
1974).46 
Judge Gilman’s use of two cases from the Seventh Circuit demonstrate a 
split between the Seventh and Sixth Circuits. In Petties v. Carter, the Seventh 
Circuit concluded “[w]hile the cost of treatment is a factor in determining what 
constitutes adequate, minimum-level care, medical personnel cannot simply 
resort to an easier course of treatment that they know is ineffective.” 836 F.3d 
722, 730 (7th Cir. 2016).47 Applying this proposition to Atkins, Dr. Williams 
and the Department need to provide all chronic-level inmates with the antivirals, 
regardless of cost, as there is no other truly effective treatment. Additionally, in 
Stafford v. Carter the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana held 
that the Eighth Amendment had been violated when Indiana inmates in the 
chronic stage of hepatitis C had been denied treatment. No. 1:17-CV-00289-
JMS-MJD, at 43 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 13, 2018).48 The prison officials in Stafford 
based their rationing scheme and prioritization on individualized treatment 
concerns and explicitly said cost played no factor. Id. at 13–14.49 Judge Gilman 
points out that applying this to Atkins would mean an Eighth Amendment 
violation had occurred, unless Dr. Williams and the Department are making the 
argument that “what has been held to be cruel and unusual in Indiana is not cruel 
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and unusual in Tennessee.” Atkins, No. 19-6243, at 14.50 Clearly an absurd 
result. 
Although Dr. Williams did the best with what resources he was given, there 
was still a deliberate indifference on the part of the Department as a whole to 
the risks facing the infected inmates. By looking at the very nature of a prison, 
it is clear that inmates cannot obtain means to get treatment on their own. They 
are left to rely on the Department. Darrah v. Krisher points out that cost may be 
considered by prison officials for choosing a less expensive treatment. 865 F.3d 
361, 372 (6th Cir. 2017).51 But if the only effective treatment is the antivirals, 
you are violating the Eighth Amendment by not providing that treatment. There 
are two solutions: lobby for necessary funding you need from the state 
legislature or transfer some lower-level inmates into alternative programs like 
house-arrest or probation. A violation of the Eighth Amendment due to a lack 
of resources, is still a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
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